[1]刘 轶.董事高管责任保险的本土化发展路径探析[J].金融教育研究,2023,(05):62-71.
　LIU Yi.Analysis on the Localization Development Path of Directors and Officers Liability Insurance[J].,2023,(05):62-71.
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董事高管责任保险的本土化发展路径探析()
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《金融教育研究》[ISSN:1006-6977/CN:61-1281/TN]

卷:
期数:
2023年05期
页码:
62-71
栏目:
管理决策
出版日期:
2023-09-25

文章信息/Info

Title:
Analysis on the Localization Development Path of Directors and Officers Liability Insurance
文章编号:
2095-0098(2023)05-0062-10
作者:
刘 轶
(宁波财经学院 金融与信息学院,浙江 宁波 315000)
Author(s):
LIU Yi
(School of Finance and Information,Ningbo University of Finance and Economics,Ningbo,Zhejiang 315000,China)
关键词:
董事高管责任保险;  公司治理;  公司补偿制度;  保险责任
Keywords:
Directors and officers liability insurance;  Corporate governance;  Company compensation system;  Insurance liability
分类号:
F840.6
文献标志码:
A
摘要:
董事高管责任保险制度在国外运行中演化出损害补偿、利益保障和公司治理功能,是促使公司选任合格管理者的重要机制。但由于法律制度差异、法律关系失衡以及保险责任模糊等方面的因素,董事高管责任保险的功能在我国尚未充分发挥。尝试运用民法、公司法和责任保险理论,研判董事高管责任保险制度适应我国法律环境所面临的制度障碍、制约因素,并在否定公司补偿、厘清法律关系、明确保险责任并适当性强制投保的基础上,为我国《公司法》引入董事高管责任保险提供对策建议。
Abstract:
The directors and officers liability insurance system has evolved the functions of damage compensation,interest protection and corporate governance in foreign operation,which is an important mechanism to promote the selection of qualified managers.However,due to the difference of legal system,the imbalance of legal relations and the ambiguity of insurance liability,the function of directors and officers liability insurance has not been fully developed in China.This paper tries to use the civil law,company law and liability insurance theories to study the institutional obstacles and constraints facing the adaptation of directors and officers liability insurance system to China's legal environment.On the basis of denying the company compensation,clarifying the legal relationship,clarifying the insurance liability and forcing the insurance to be appropriate,this paper provides countermeasures and suggestions for introducing the directors and officers liability insurance in the Company Law of our country.

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备注/Memo

备注/Memo:
收稿日期:2023-05-06
作者简介:刘 轶(1981—),男,河北保定人,博士,副教授,研究方向为保险法、公司法。
更新日期/Last Update: 2023-09-25