[1]袁春生,汪青.经理人市场治理实证研究述评与启示[J].金融教育研究,2015,(04):48-58.
　YUANChunsheng,WANGQing.The Review and Enlightenment of the Empirical Research on the Managers’Market Management[J].,2015,(04):48-58.
点击复制

经理人市场治理实证研究述评与启示()
分享到：

《金融教育研究》[ISSN:1006-6977/CN:61-1281/TN]

卷:
期数:
2015年04期
页码:
48-58
栏目:
出版日期:
2015-07-31

文章信息/Info

Title:
The Review and Enlightenment of the Empirical Research on the Managers’Market Management
作者:
袁春生;汪青;
江西师范大学财政金融学院,江西南昌,330022
Author(s):
YUANChunsheng; WANGQing
关键词:
经理人市场; 公司治理; 高管聘用; 报酬激励; 声誉机制
Keywords:
managers ’ market;  corporate governance;  executives hired;  remuneration incentive;  reputation mechanism
分类号:
F276.6
文献标志码:
A
摘要:
作为公司财务、人力资源以及劳动经济学等多学科交叉研究领域,近年来经理人市场的治理作用及其机制引起了国内外学者的广泛关注,并取得了较为丰富的研究成果。文章在系统梳理经理人市场治理相关研究文献的基础上,提出经理人市场治理机制分析框架,然后从公司高管选聘、更换、报酬激励与声誉激励等方面对国外经理人市场治理相关实证研究进行回顾,最后进一步指出对我国该领域的研究启示。
Abstract:
As the cross-over study field of corporate finance,human resource management and labor econom-ics,the management of managers’market and it’s governance mechanism caused the wide attention of scholars both at home and abroad,and abundant achievements have been achieved in recent years. This paper put forward the re-search framework of managers’market governance mechanism based on the relevant research literature. Then it made related empirical research review on foreign managers’market management from the aspects of company exec-utives,replacement,remuneration incentive and reputation incentive. Finally,this paper point out the research en-lightenment for managers’market management in our country.

参考文献/References:

[1]Fee C E.,and Hadlock C J.Raids,Rewards,and Reputations in the Market for Managerial Talent[J].Review of Financial Studies,2003,16(4):1315-1357.
[2]Fama E F.Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm[J].Journal of Political Economy,1980,88(2):288-307.
[3]Holmstrom B.Managerial Incentive Problem:A Dynamic Perspective Essays in Economics and Management in Honor of Lars Wahlbeck[M].Helsinki:Swedish School of Economics,1982.
[4]Fama E F.,and Jensen M C.Separation of Ownership and Control[J].Journal of Law and Economics,1983,26(2):301-325
[5]Brickley J A.,Linck J S.,and Coles J L.What Happens to CEOs after They Retire?New Evidence on Career Concerns,Horizon Problems,and CEO Incentives[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1999,52(3):341-377.
[6]Yermack D.Remuneration,Retention,and Reputation Incentives for Outside Directors[J].Journal of Finance,2004,59(5):2281-2308.
[7]Kaplan S N.,and Reishus D.Outside Directorships and Corporate Performance[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1990,27(2):389-410.
[8]Harford J.Takeover Bids and Target Directors' Incentives:the Impact of a Bid on Directors' Wealth and Board Seats[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2003,69(1):51-83.
[9]Chen H.,and Leng F.Pay-Performance Sensitivity in a Heterogeneous Managerial Labor Market[J].Journal of management accounting research,2004,16(1):19-33.
[10]Agrawal A.,Knoeber C R.,and Tsoulouhas T.Are Outsiders Handicapped in CEO Successions?[J].Journal of Corporate Finance,2006,12(3):619-644.
[11]Chan W.External Recruitment versus Internal Promotion[J].Journal of Labor Economics,1996,14(4):555-570.
[12]Alberto Bayo-Moriones,and Pedro Ortín-ngel.Internal Promotion versus External Recruitment in Industrial Plants in Spain[J].Industrial and Labor Relations Review,2006,59(3):451-470.
[13]Naveen L.Organizational Complexity and Succession Planning[J].Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,2006(41):661-683.
[14]Fahlenbrach R.,Low A.,and Stulz R M.Why do Firms Appoint CEOs as Outside Directors?[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2010,97(1):12-32.
[15]Murphy K J.,and Zabojnik J.Managerial Capital and the Market for CEOs[EB/OL].2007,working paper,http://ssrn.com/abstract=984376.
[16]Hermalin B E.Trends in Corporate Governance[J].Journal of Finance,2005,60(5):2351-2384.
[17]Borokhovich K A.,Parrino R.,and Trapani T.Outside Directors and CEO Selection[J].Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,1996,31(3):337-355.
[18] Choi J J,Park S W,Yoo S S.The Value of outside directors:evidence from corporate governance reform in Korea[J].Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,2007,42(4):941-962.
[19]Conyon M J.,and Read L E.A Model of the Supply of Executives for Outside Directorships[J].Journal of Corporate Finance,2006,12(3):645-659.
[20]Masulis R W.,and Mobbs S.Are All Inside Directors the Same?Evidence from the External Directorship Market[J].Journal of Finance,2011,66(3):823-872.
[21]Booth J R.,and Deli D N.Factors Affecting the Number of Outside Directorships Held by CEOs[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1996,40(1):81-104.
[22]Perry T.,and Peyer U.Board Seat Accumulation by Executives:a Shareholder's Perspective[J].Journal of Finance,2005,60(4):2083-2123.
[23]Kaplan S N.,and Minton B A.How has CEO Turnover Changed?[J].International Review of Finance,2012,12(1):57-87.
[24]Kaplan S N.Are U.S.CEOs Overpaid?[J].Academy of Management Perspectives,2008,22(2):5-20.
[25]Coughlan A T.,and Schmidt R M.Executive Compensation,Management Turnover,and Firm Performance:An Empirical Investigation[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,1985,7(1-3):43-66.
[26]Warner J B.,Watts R L.,and Wruck K H.Stock Prices and Top Management Changes[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1988,20(1-2):461-492.
[27]Gillan S L.Recent Developments in Corporate Governance:An Overview[J].Journal of Corporate Finance,2006,12(3):381-402.
[28]Gibson M S.Is Corporate Governance Ineffective in Emerging Markets?[J] Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,2003,38(1):231-250.
[29]Goya V K.,and Park C W.Board Leadership Structure and CEO Turnover[J].Journal of Corporate Finance,2002,8(1):49-66.
[30]Berry T K.,Bizjak J M.,Lemmon M L.,and Naveen L.Organizational Complexity and CEO Labor Markets:Evidence from Diversified firms[J].Journal of Corporate Finance,2006,12(4):797-817.
[31]Chang Y Y.,Dasgupta S.,and Hilary G.CEO Ability,Pay,and Firm Performance[J].Management Science,2010,56(10):1633-1652.
[32]Johnson W B.,Magee R P.,and Nagarajan N J.,and Newman H A.An Analysis of the Stock Price Reaction to Sudden Executive Deaths:Implications for the Managerial Labor Market[J].Journal of Accounting Economic,1985.7(1-3):151-174.
[33]Nguyen B D.,and Nielsen K M.What Death can Tell:Are Executives Paid for Their Contributions to Firm Value?[EB/OL].2010,Working Paper,http://ssrn.com/abstract=1695366.
[34]Milbourn T T.CEO Reputation and Stock-based Compensation[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2003,68(2):233-262.
[35]Cremers M.,and Grinstein Y.Does the Market for CEO Talent Explain Controversial CEO Pay Practices?[EB/OL].2011,Working Paper,http://ssrn.com/abstract=1108761
[36]Jensen M C.,and Murphy K J.Performance Pay and Top-management Incentives[J].Journal of Political Economy,1990,98(2):225-264.
[37]Zabojnik J.On the Efficiency of Markets for Managers[J].Economic Theory,2001,18(3):701-710.
[38]Garvey G T.,and Swan P L.The Economics of Corporate Governance:Beyond the Marshallian Firm[J].Journal of Corporate Finance,1994,1(2):139-174.
[39]Aggarwal R K.,and Samwick A A.Executive Compensation,Strategic Competition,and Relative Performance Evaluation:Theory and Evidence[J].Journal of Finance,1999,54(6):1999-2043.
[40]Frydman C.,Saks R E.Executive Compensation:A New View from a Long-term Perspective,1936-2005[J].Review of Financial Studies,2010,23(5):2109-2138.
[41]Bebchuk L A.,and Fried J M.Pay without Performance:Overview of the Issues[J].Journal of Applied Corporate Finance,2005,17(4):8-23.
[42]Hall B J.,Liebman J B.Are CEOs Really Paid Like Bureaucrats?[J].Quarterly Journal of Economics,1998,113(3):653-691.
[43]Conyon M J.,and Murphy K J.The Prince and the Pauper?CEO Pay in the United States and United Kingdom[J].Economic Journal,2000,110(467):640-671.
[44]Conyon M J.,Core J E.,and Guay W R.Are US CEOs Paid More Than UK CEOs?Inferences From Risk-Adjusted Pay[J].Review of Financial Studies,2011,24(2):402-438.
[45]Fernandes N.,Ferreira M A.,Matos P.,and Murphy K J.Are US CEOs Paid More?New International Evidence[J].Review of Financial Studies,2013,26(2):323-367.
[46]Kaplan S N.,and Rauh J.Wall Street and Main Street:What Contributes to the Rise in the Highest Incomes?[J].Review of Financial Studies,2010,23(3):1004-1050.
[47]Kaplan S N.2012.Executive Compensation and Corporate Governance in the U.S:Perceptions,Facts,and Challenges,NBER Working Paper No 18395.
[48]Coles J.,and Hoi C.New Evidence on the Market for Directors:Board Membership and Pennsylvania Senate Bill 1310[J].Journal of Finance,2003,58(1):197-230.
[49]Gibbons R.,and Murphy K J.Optimal Incentive Contracts in the Presence of Career Concerns:Theory and Evidence[J].Journal of Political Economy,1992,100(3):468-505.
[50]Persons O S.The Effects of Fraud and Lawsuit Revelation on U.S.Executive Turnover and Compensation[J].Journal of Business Ethics,2006,64(4):405-419.
[51]Majdi S.,Rahman R A.Labour Market Consequences after Fraud and Lawsuit Revelation[J].International Research Journal of Finance and Economics,2011,63(4):189-198.
[52]Cowen A P.,and Marcel J J.Damaged Goods:Board Decisions to Dismiss Reputationally Compromised Directors[J].Academy of Management Journal,2011,54(3):509-527.
[53]Srinivasan,S.Consequences of Financial Reporting Failure for Outside Directors:Evidence from Accounting Restatements and Audit Committee Members[J].Journal of Accounting Research,2005,43(2):291-334.
[54]Desai H.,Hogan C E.,and Wilkins M S.The Reputational Penalty for Aggressive Accounting:Earnings Restatements and Management Turnover[J].Accounting Review,2006,81(1):83-112.
[55]Ertimur Y.,Ferri F.,and Maber D A.Reputation Penalties for Poor Monitoring of Executive Pay:Evidence From Option Backdating[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2012,104(1):118-144.
[56]Fich E M.,and Shivdasani A.Financial Fraud,Director Reputation,and Shareholder Wealth[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2007,86(2):306-336.
[57]Agrawal A.,Jaffe J F.,and Karpoff J M.Management Turnover and Governance Changes Following the Revelation of Fraud[J].Journal of Law and Economics,1999,42(1):309-342.
[58]Helland E.Reputational Penalties and the Merits of Class Action Securities Litigation[J].Journal of Law and Economics,2006,49(2):365-395.

相似文献/References:

[1]李松,卢宇燕,洪正,等.加强公司治理能够防止金融机构过度冒险吗?——关于高管激励与银行冒险行为的一个综述[J].金融教育研究,2012,(01):57.
　LI Song,LU Yuyan,HONG Zheng.Can Improving Corporate Governance Help Solve over Risk -Taking Problem in Banking Industry --Survey about Executive Incentives and Bank- Risk- Taking Behavior[J].,2012,(04):57.
[2]温章林.公司治理影响会计稳健性的实证研究[J].金融教育研究,2012,(02):58.
　WEN Zhanglin.Empirical Research on the Effects of Corporate Governance on Accounting Conservatism[J].,2012,(04):58.
[3]袁春生,赵小青.基于公司治理监督职能的财务舞弊防范——一个分析框架及其应用[J].金融教育研究,2012,(03):63.
　YUAN Chunsheng,ZHAO Xiaoqing.Financial Fraud Prevention Based on Corporate Governance＇s Monitoring Function --an Analysis Framework and its Applications[J].,2012,(04):63.
[4]姜成会,郑家秀.公司治理与审计费用相关性检验——来自沪深A股2010年证券市场数据[J].金融教育研究,2012,(06):44.
　JIANG Chenghui,ZHENG Jiaxiu.Correlation Test on Corporate Governance and Audit Fees --from Shanghai and Shenzhen A Shares＇Data in 2010 Securities Market[J].,2012,(04):44.
[5]廖继胜,刘志虹.我国中小银行风险控制能力的主成分分析——基于公司治理视角[J].金融教育研究,2014,(01):6.
　LIAO Jisheng,WU Zhihong.Principal Component Analysis on the Risk Control Abilities of Chinese Small and Medium-Sized Banks from the Perspective of Corporate Governance[J].,2014,(04):6.

备注/Memo

备注/Memo:
国家自然科学基金项目“民营上市公司外聘高管的代理成本与激励机制效果:基于经理人市场视角”(71262025); 国家社会科学基金项目“非正式制度对我国会计准则执行的影响研究(12BJY015); 江西省社会科学规划一般项目“政府干预、市场化改革与国有企业的高管激励”(14GL52)
更新日期/Last Update: 1900-01-01