[1]黄小勇,熊 洁,廖惠甜.高管性别、企业风险与薪酬绩效敏感性[J].金融教育研究,2019,(03):36-45.
　HUANG Xiaoyong,XIONG Jie,LIAO Huitian.Executives' Gender,Corporate Risk and Salary Performance Sensitivity[J].,2019,(03):36-45.
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高管性别、企业风险与薪酬绩效敏感性()
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《金融教育研究》[ISSN:1006-6977/CN:61-1281/TN]

卷:
期数:
2019年03期
页码:
36-45
栏目:
管理决策
出版日期:
2019-06-10

文章信息/Info

Title:
Executives' Gender,Corporate Risk and Salary Performance Sensitivity
文章编号:
2095-0098(2019)03-0036-10
作者:
黄小勇;  熊 洁;  廖惠甜
江西师范大学 财政金融学院,江西 南昌 330022
Author(s):
HUANG Xiaoyong;  XIONG Jie;  LIAO Huitian
Financial College,Jiangxi Normal University,Nanchang,Jiangxi 330022,China
关键词:
CEO性别;  企业风险;  薪酬绩效敏感性
Keywords:
the gender of the CEO;  corporate risk;  salary performance sensitivity
分类号:
F224; F832.51
文献标志码:
A
摘要:
回顾高管薪酬与企业业绩、高管特征与薪酬绩效敏感性、企业风险与薪酬绩效敏感性之间关系的相关文献。研究了CEO性别差异、企业风险及二者的交互作用对企业高管薪酬绩效敏感性的影响。实证研究发现:一是高管的薪酬绩效敏感性受到CEO性别的影响,CEO为男性的企业高管薪酬绩效敏感性比CEO为女性的企业高管薪酬绩效敏感性更高; 二是企业风险与高管薪酬绩效敏感性呈显著的负相关关系,即企业风险上升会降低高管薪酬与企业业绩之间的正相关性; 三是考虑企业风险因素,CEO为男性的企业其高管薪酬与企业业绩仍然存在显著的相关性,而CEO为女性的企业其高管薪酬与企业业绩之间不存在相关性。
Abstract:
By reviewing relevant literatures on the relationship between executive compensation and corporate performance,executive characteristics and salary performance sensitivity,and the relationship between corporate risk and salary performance sensitivity.This paper studies the influence of CEO's gender difference,corporate risk and their interaction on the sensitivity of executive compensation performance.The empirical research shows that:first,the salary performance sensitivity of senior executives is affected by the gender of CEO; the compensation performance sensitivity of male CEO is higher than that of female CEO.Second,there is a significant negative correlation between enterprise risk and executive compensation performance sensitivity; in other words,the rise of corporate risk will reduce the positive correlation between executive compensation and corporate performance.Third,considering corporate risk factors,there is still a significant correlation between executive compensation and corporate performance in enterprises with male CEO; but there was no correlation between executive compensation and corporate performance in companies with female CEO.

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备注/Memo

备注/Memo:
收稿日期:2019-02-03
基金项目:江西省教改重点课题“基于校企联动的会计学专业”五个一工程“实习实践培养模式研究”(JXJG-15-2-4); 江西省重大委托课题“江西省互联网金融动态监测与政府监管研究”(16WTZD14)
作者简介:黄小勇(1977-),男,江西石城人,博士,教授,博士生导师,研究方向为经济决策与公司财务。
更新日期/Last Update: 2019-06-10