[1]袁春生,曾碧蓉,廖楚君.董事会独立性、薪酬差距与公司业绩[J].金融教育研究,2018,(04):3-13.
　YUAN Chunsheng,ZENG Birong,LIAO Chujun.Board of Directors’ Independence,Compensation Gap and Corporate Performance[J].,2018,(04):3-13.
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董事会独立性、薪酬差距与公司业绩()
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《金融教育研究》[ISSN:1006-6977/CN:61-1281/TN]

卷:
期数:
2018年04期
页码:
3-13
栏目:
出版日期:
2018-08-20

文章信息/Info

Title:
Board of Directors’ Independence,Compensation Gap and Corporate Performance
文章编号:
2095-0098(2018)04-0003-11
作者:
袁春生;  曾碧蓉;  廖楚君
江西师范大学 财政金融学院,江西 南昌 330022
Author(s):
YUAN Chunsheng;  ZENG Birong;  LIAO Chujun
College of Finance,Jiangxi Normal University,Nanchang,Jiangxi 330022,China
关键词:
薪酬差距;  董事会独立性;  公司业绩;  锦标赛理论;  社会公平理论
Keywords:
compensation gap;  board of directors’ independence;  company performance;  tournament theory;  social equity theory
分类号:
F276.6
文献标志码:
A
摘要:
文章对公司薪酬差距与业绩的关系、董事会独立性对公司薪酬差距的影响,以及董事会独立性对薪酬差距与公司业绩关系的影响进行实证研究。以2009-2014年沪深两市A股上市公司为样本的研究结果表明,较大的薪酬差距可提升公司业绩,符合锦标赛理论。然而较高的董事会独立性会降低薪酬差距、降低薪酬差距对公司业绩的提升作用,此结果与社会公平理论的预期一致。研究结果总体表明,薪酬差距具有较强的激励作用,而独立董事更关注薪酬差距引发的社会公平问题。研究结果对企业薪酬政策的制订和居民收入差距扩大的治理具有一定的参考价值。
Abstract:
This paper test the relationship between compensation gap and corporate performance,the effects of board of directors’ independence on compensation gap,and the effects of board of directors’ independence on the relationship between compensation gap and corporate performance.Based on the research results of A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2009 to 2014,it shows that a large compensation gap can improve the company’s performance,and conform to the tournament theory.However,higher board independence will reduce the compensation gap,and then reduce the effect of compensation gap on corporate performance improvement,which is consistent with the expectation of social equity theory.The research results show that the compensation gap has a strong incentive effect,while the independent directors pay more attention to the social equity problems caused by the compensation gap.The research results have certain reference value to the establishment of enterprise compensation policy and the governance of the widening gap of resident income.

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备注/Memo

备注/Memo:
收稿日期:2018-04-26
基金项目:国家自然科学基金项目(71262025)
作者简介:袁春生(1973-),男,江西吉水人,教授,管理学博士,研究方向为公司治理;
曾碧蓉(1991-),女,江西泰和人,硕士研究生,研究方向为公司财务管理;
廖楚君(1992-),女,江西奉新人,硕士研究生,研究方向为会计信息。
更新日期/Last Update: 2018-08-20