[1]刘 娟,黄小勇.并购重组中谁在为不达标的业绩补偿承诺买单?——以掌趣科技为例[J].金融教育研究,2018,(02):37-41,60.
　LIU Juan,HUANG Xiaoyong.Who is Paying for the Performance Compensation Commitments that are not up to Standard in the Merger and Reorganization?——Take the OurPalm Technology as an Example[J].,2018,(02):37-41,60.
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并购重组中谁在为不达标的业绩补偿承诺买单?——以掌趣科技为例()
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《金融教育研究》[ISSN:1006-6977/CN:61-1281/TN]

卷:
期数:
2018年02期
页码:
37-41,60
栏目:
经济发展与管理决策
出版日期:
2018-04-20

文章信息/Info

Title:
Who is Paying for the Performance Compensation Commitments that are not up to Standard in the Merger and Reorganization?——Take the OurPalm Technology as an Example
文章编号:
2095-0098(2018)02-0037-06
作者:
刘 娟;  黄小勇
江西师范大学 财政金融学院,江西 南昌 330022
Author(s):
LIU Juan;  HUANG Xiaoyong
School of Finance,Jiangxi Normal University,Nanchang,Jiangxi 330022,China
关键词:
并购重组;  业绩承诺;  中小投资者保护
Keywords:
merger and reorganization;  performance commitment;  small and medium investor protection
分类号:
F830.33
文献标志码:
A
摘要:
业绩补偿承诺作为一种创新的并购契约形式,已经是并购重组的“标准配置”。业绩承诺设计的初衷是将并购重组之后标的公司的经营风险在投资公司与标的公司的原股东之间进行风险分配。但在标的公司承诺的业绩未达标的情况下,补偿机制真的保护了中小投资者的利益吗?实际上为未达标的业绩补偿承诺买单的依然是处在市场弱势地位的中小投资者。由此,为保证并购者付出相对公允的对价,实现公平交易,应在业绩承诺签订前后两个阶段对业绩承诺补偿制度进行完善; 同时,中小投资者要理性地看待业绩承诺,审慎判断。
Abstract:
As an innovative form of merger and acquisition contract,performance compensation commitment has been a “standard configuration” for merger and acquisition reorganization.The purpose of the performance pledge is to allocate the operation risk of the target company after the merger and acquisition to the original shareholders of the investment company and the target company.But does the compensation mechanism really protect the interests of small and medium-sized investors when the promised performance of the target company fails to meet the standards? In fact,it is the small and medium-sized investors who are still in a weak market position to pay for unmet performance compensation.Therefore,to ensure the relatively fair price of the merger and the fair transaction,to get a fair deal,the compensation system should be perfected in the two stages before and after the performance commitment.At the same time,small and medium-sized investors should rationally look at performance commitments and prudent judge the risk of this form.

参考文献/References:

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备注/Memo

备注/Memo:
收稿日期:2017-11-12
基金项目:江西省教改重点课题“基于校企联动的会计学专业‘五个一工程'实习实践培养模式研究”(JXJG-15-2-4); 2013年江西师范大学学位与研究生教育教学改革研究项目“高校研究生差异化教育与创新创业研究——基于经管类研究生的问卷调查与教育实验”; 江西师范大学校级教改课题“高校青年教师成长影响因素及路径优化研究”
作者简介:刘 娟(1993-),女,江西萍乡人,硕士研究生,主要研究方向为财务管理实践;
黄小勇(1977-),男,江西石城人,博士,教授,研究方向为公司财务、战略管理、区域经济。
更新日期/Last Update: 2018-04-20