[1]蒋 瑶,张庆君.股东控股权、股权激励与公司绩效——基于京津冀上市公司数据[J].金融教育研究,2016,(06):42-47.
　JIANG Yao,ZHANG Qingjun.Ownership Concentration,Equity Incentive and Corporate Performance——Based on the Data of Listed Companies of the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei Region[J].,2016,(06):42-47.
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股东控股权、股权激励与公司绩效——基于京津冀上市公司数据()
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《金融教育研究》[ISSN:1006-6977/CN:61-1281/TN]

卷:
期数:
2016年06期
页码:
42-47
栏目:
出版日期:
2016-12-01

文章信息/Info

Title:
Ownership Concentration,Equity Incentive and Corporate Performance——Based on the Data of Listed Companies of the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei Region
作者:
蒋 瑶;  张庆君
天津财经大学 经济学院,天津 300222
Author(s):
JIANG Yao;  ZHANG Qingjun
School of Economics,Tianjin University of Finance and Economics,Tianjin 300222,China
关键词:
京津冀;  股权激励;  控股权;  公司业绩
Keywords:
Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei region;  equity incentive;  ownership concentration;  corporate performance
分类号:
F276.6; F224
文献标志码:
A
摘要:
文章选取了自2006年股权激励正式实施以来,沪深两市实施过股权激励的京津冀上市公司为研究样本,运用实证分析研究股权激励与公司业绩之间的相关关系,以及股东控股权对两者关联的影响。股权激励并非一定能够发挥激励作用,提升公司业绩,而与股权激励比例及股东控股权的大小有关。研究结果表明股权激励与公司业绩之间呈现出较为复杂的非线性相关关系,且股东控股权对两者关系具有相应地影响。
Abstract:
The policy of equity incentive was been put into implementation in 2006.Many companies have implemented equity incentive in stock markets of Shanghai and Shenzhen since then.This article selects the listed companies of Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei region as research samples,and uses the empirical analysis,in order to analyze the relationship between equity incentive and corporate performance and the effect of ownership concentration on the relationship.Equity incentive can not necessarily play a role of incentives,and improve the company’s performance; it’s related to the proportion of equity incentive and the size of the ownership concentration.In this paper,the results show that the equity incentive and corporate performance presents a complex nonlinear relationship,and the ownership concentration has the corresponding effects on this relationship.

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备注/Memo

备注/Memo:
收稿日期:2016-09-10基金项目:国家社会科学基金项目(15BJ L028)作者简介:蒋 瑶(1990-),女,河北张家口人,硕士研究生; 张庆君(1974-),男,辽宁大连人,教授,博导,研究方向为金融理论与政策。
更新日期/Last Update: 1900-01-01