[1]郭兰平.双寡头竞争平台的商业模式选择研究[J].金融教育研究,2015,(04):64-73.
　GUO Lanping.The Study of the Business Model Selection of Duopoly Competition Platform[J].,2015,(04):64-73.
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双寡头竞争平台的商业模式选择研究()
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《金融教育研究》[ISSN:1006-6977/CN:61-1281/TN]

卷:
期数:
2015年04期
页码:
64-73
栏目:
出版日期:
2015-07-31

文章信息/Info

Title:
The Study of the Business Model Selection of Duopoly Competition Platform
作者:
郭兰平;
宜春学院经济与管理学院,江西宜春,336000
Author(s):
GUO Lanping
关键词:
双寡头竞争平台; 商业模式; 组内网络外部性; 组间网络外部性
Keywords:
duopoly competition platform;  business model;  intra-group network externality;  inter-group net-work externality
分类号:
F224.33
文献标志码:
A
摘要:
通过建立模型,并将负的组内网络外部性和正的组间网络外部性引入到模型中,研究双寡头竞争平台的商业模式选择。研究结果表明,当消费者给商家带来的正组间网络外部性效应与商家带给消费者的正组间网络外部性效应二者之间的差距足够大时,两个平台均会选择双边市场模式;而当二者之间的差距异常小时,两个平台将选择单边市场模式;但是当二者之间的差距介于中间水平时,其结果就主要取决于平台产品或服务的差异化程度以及商家之间负的组内网络外部性强度。
Abstract:
By setting up a model and introducing the externality of negative intra-group network and positive inter-group network into the model,this paper studies the choice of business model of duopoly competitive plat-form. The conclusions show that the two platforms will choose to be two-sided market model if there is a large e-nough gap between the positive inter-group network externality effects brought to the merchants by the consumers and the positive inter-group network externality effects brought to the consumers by the merchants. And the two platforms will choose to be the one-sided market model if the gap is small enough between them. But if the gap is in intermediate level ,the result is mainly depends on the platform products or the degree of differentiation service and the negative intensity of intra-group network externality among the merchants.

参考文献/References:

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备注/Memo

备注/Memo:
江西省高校人文社科项目“平台企业的开放性策略研究”(GL1464)
更新日期/Last Update: 1900-01-01