[1]魏 巍,王云芳.政策性负担挤出上市企业研发投资了吗?[J].金融教育研究,2022,(06):32-42.
　WEI Wei,WANG Yunfang.Does Policy Burden Crowed Out R&D Investment of Chinese Listed Enterprises?[J].,2022,(06):32-42.
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政策性负担挤出上市企业研发投资了吗?()
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《金融教育研究》[ISSN:1006-6977/CN:61-1281/TN]

卷:
期数:
2022年06期
页码:
32-42
栏目:
出版日期:
2022-11-25

文章信息/Info

Title:
Does Policy Burden Crowed Out R&D Investment of Chinese Listed Enterprises?
文章编号:
2095-0098(2022)06-0032-11
作者:
魏 巍1;  王云芳2
(1.天津电子信息职业技术学院,天津 300011; 2.北京安永华明会计师事务所,北京 100738)
Author(s):
WEI Wei1;  WANG Yunfang2
(1.Tianjin Electronic Information on College,Tianjin 300350,China; 2.Beijing Ernst & Young Huaming CPA Firm,Beijing 100738,China)
关键词:
政策性负担;  研发支出;  挤出效应;  渐进DID;  异质性处理效应
Keywords:
Policy burden;  R&; D expenditure;  Crowding out effect;  Progressive DID;  Heterogeneous treatment effect
分类号:
F239.6; F275.1
文献标志码:
A
摘要:
以2011—2018沪深主板上市公司为样本,利用双向固定效应模型证明政策性负担的上升会挤出企业研发投入。将政策性负担视为一种外生冲击并剔除政策性负担为中等的企业后,将样本分为受冲击的高负担组(处理组)和不受冲击的低负担组(控制组),并利用渐进DID再次验证了挤出效应的存在——处理组冲击前后研发投入的下降显著高于控制组。考虑到高负担组(处理组)很可能在特定年度降为低负担,即可能存在“处理组时变”现象,并由此导致多期DID估计在对2×2分组估计系数(ATT)进行加权时因存在“负权重”而产生估计偏误,故借助Chaisemartin & Haultfoeuille(2020)提出的带异质性处理效应的双向固定估计量(TWFEDD)进行再检验,发现在排除负权重扰动后,挤出效应依然成立。借助外生处理效应(RA/IPW/IPWRA估计量)和内生处理效应(Heckit Two-Step估计量),证实了挤出效应在修正自选择偏误后依然稳健。
Abstract:
Taking companies listed on the main boards of Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2011 to 2018 as samples,the two-way fixed effect model is used to prove that the increase of policy burden will crowd out the R&D investment of enterprises.After considering policy burden as an exogenous shock and excluding enterprises with medium policy burden,the sample was divided into a high burden group exposed to shocks(treatment group)and a low burden group not exposed to shocks(control group),and the progressive DID was used to verify the existence of crowding out effect again:the decrease of R&D investment in the treatment group before and after the shock was significantly higher than that in the control group.Considering that the high burden group(treatment group)is likely to be reduced to low burden in a particular year,that is,the phenomenon of “treatment group time-varying” may exist,when the 2*2 grouping estimation coefficient(ATT)is weighted,the multi-stage DID estimation is biased due to the existence of “negative weight”; therefore,the bidirectional fixed estimator with heterogeneous treatment effect(TWFEDD)proposed by Chaisemartin & Haultfoeuille(2020)was used for retest,it is found that the crowding out effect still holds after the negative weight disturbance is excluded.With the help of the exogenous treatment effect(RA/IPW/IPWRA estimator)and the endogenous treatment effect(Heckit two-step estimator),it is confirmed that the crowding out effect is still robust after correcting the self-selection bias.Finally,from the elimination of crowding out effect,it put forward some improving policy suggestions.

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备注/Memo

备注/Memo:
收稿日期:2022-04-27
作者简介:魏 巍(1983—),女,河北沧州人,硕士,会计师,研究方向为企业内控与审计。
更新日期/Last Update: 2022-11-25