[1]姜 琪,狄慧敏.数据驱动型平台并购的反竞争效应及反垄断路径研究[J].金融教育研究,2022,(02):3-13.
　JIANG Qi,DI Huimin.Research on Anti-Competitive Effect and Anti-Monopoly Path of Data-Driven Platform M&A[J].,2022,(02):3-13.
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数据驱动型平台并购的反竞争效应及反垄断路径研究()
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《金融教育研究》[ISSN:1006-6977/CN:61-1281/TN]

卷:
期数:
2022年02期
页码:
3-13
栏目:
经济观察:平台经济反垄断研究
出版日期:
2022-03-25

文章信息/Info

Title:
Research on Anti-Competitive Effect and Anti-Monopoly Path of Data-Driven Platform M&A
文章编号:
2095-0098(2022)02-0003-11
作者:
姜 琪;  狄慧敏
山东财经大学 公共管理学院,山东 济南 250014
Author(s):
JIANG Qi;  DI Huimin
School of Public Administration,Shandong University of Finance and Economics,Jinan,Shandong 250014,China
关键词:
数据驱动型并购;  反竞争效应;  隐私风险;  反垄断路径
Keywords:
Data driven M &;  A;  Anti competitive effect;  Privacy risk;  Antitrust path
分类号:
F014.9
文献标志码:
A
摘要:
大数据时代以获取数据资产为目的的数据驱动型平台并购不断增多,数据驱动型平台并购引起的反竞争效应、隐私风险等反垄断问题也日益凸显。数据驱动型平台并购会带来强化市场支配地位、阻碍竞争、消除潜在创新的反竞争效应,会给用户带来隐私风险。由于数据具有用户权利与竞争价值的双重属性,隐私与竞争逐渐产生交汇,主要表现为并购削弱了用户隐私保护的力度、平台通过修改隐私政策增强竞争优势、占据优势地位的平台会排挤隐私保护政策更优的平台。为了消除数据驱动型平台并购引起的反竞争效应与隐私风险,反垄断机构要从修订申报标准、淡化“相关市场”概念、积极行使主动调查权、全面评估竞争影响、着重考察单边协调与封锁效应等方面应对反竞争效应; 从加强对隐私与竞争交汇的认识、完善审查工具与分析框架、完善平台隐私保护政策、附加限制性条件、鼓励平台间隐私保护竞争等方面应对隐私风险问题。
Abstract:
In the era of big data,mergers and acquisitions of data-driven platforms for the purpose of acquiring data assets are increasing,and anti-competitive effects,privacy risks and other anti-monopoly problems caused by mergers and acquisitions of data-driven platforms are also becoming increasingly prominent.Data-driven platform mergers and acquisitions have the anti-competitive effect of strengthening market dominance,impeding competition and eliminating potential innovation,as well as privacy risks for users.Since data has the dual properties of user rights and competitive value,privacy and competition gradually converge,which is mainly manifested as merger and acquisition weakens the strength of user privacy protection,platforms enhance their competitive advantages by modifying their privacy policies,and platforms with a dominant position will squeeze out platforms with better privacy protection policies.In order to eliminate the anti-competitive effect and privacy risk caused by data-driven platform mergers and acquisitions,anti-monopoly agencies should revise the declaration standard,weaken the concept of “relevant market”,actively exercise the right of active investigation,comprehensively evaluate the competition impact,and focus on unilateral coordination and blocking effect to deal with the anti-competitive effect.Privacy risks should be addressed from strengthening the understanding of the intersection of privacy and competition,perfecting the review tools and analysis framework,perfecting the privacy protection policies of platforms,attaching restrictive conditions,and encouraging the competition of privacy protection between platforms.

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备注/Memo

备注/Memo:
收稿日期:2021-11-01
基金项目:国家社会科学基金项目“平台经济的反垄断策略及有效竞争实现路径研究”(21BJY156)
作者简介:姜 琪(1984—),男,山东威海人,教授,博士生导师,研究方向为平台经济、反垄断。
更新日期/Last Update: 2022-03-25