[1]袁春生,赵云珠.媒体监督、管理防御与股价崩盘风险[J].金融教育研究,2021,(04):17-29.
　YUAN Chunsheng,ZHAO Yunzhu.Media Supervision,Managerial Entrenchment and Stock Price Crash Risk[J].,2021,(04):17-29.
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媒体监督、管理防御与股价崩盘风险()
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《金融教育研究》[ISSN:1006-6977/CN:61-1281/TN]

卷:
期数:
2021年04期
页码:
17-29
栏目:
管理决策
出版日期:
2021-07-25

文章信息/Info

Title:
Media Supervision,Managerial Entrenchment and Stock Price Crash Risk
文章编号:
2095-0098(2021)04-0017-13
作者:
袁春生;  赵云珠
江西师范大学 财政金融学院,江西 南昌 330022
Author(s):
YUAN Chunsheng;  ZHAO Yunzhu
College of Finance,Jiangxi Normal University,Nanchang,Jiangxi 330022,China
关键词:
媒体监督;  管理防御;  股价崩盘风险;  公司治理
Keywords:
Media supervision;  Managerial entrenchment;  Stock price crash risk;  Corporate governance
分类号:
F832.51
文献标志码:
A
摘要:
运用2007—2018年中国A股上市公司的数据,实证研究管理防御行为对股价崩盘风险的影响,以及媒体监督在其中的作用。研究结果表明:经理人管理防御行为会加剧公司股价崩盘风险; 进一步区分产权性质后发现,在国有企业中,管理防御对股价崩盘风险的正向影响更为显著; 媒体监督较强时,管理防御与股价崩盘风险的正向关系较弱,即媒体监督能够抑制管理防御与股价崩盘风险的正向关系,且此治理作用在国有企业更为显著。研究还发现,媒体监督在管理防御行为与股价崩盘风险关系中的中介效应并不明显。
Abstract:
The paper uses the data of Chinese A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2018 to empirically study the impact of managerial entrenchment behavior on the stock price crash risk,and the role of media supervision.The results show that managerial entrenchment behavior can aggravate the risk of the company's stock price crash.After further distinguishing the nature of property rights,the results show that the positive impact of managerial entrenchment on the risk of stock price crash is more significant in state-owned enterprises; when media supervision is strong,the positive relationship between managerial entrenchment and the risk of stock price crash is weak,that is,media supervision can inhibit the positive relationship between management entrenchment and the risk of stock price crash,and this governance effect is more significant in state-owned enterprises.Our study also found that the intermediary effect of media supervision in the relationship between managerial entrenchment behavior and the risk of a stock price crash is not obvious.

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备注/Memo

备注/Memo:
收稿日期:2020-03-08
基金项目:国家自然科学基金项目“民营上市公司外聘高管的代理成本与激励机制效果:基于经理人市场视角”(71262025)
作者简介:袁春生(1973-),男,江西吉水人,博士,教授,研究方向为公司治理。
更新日期/Last Update: 2021-08-10