[1]胡礼文,刘子青,贺 湘.独立董事薪酬激励对非效率投资的影响研究[J].金融教育研究,2021,(01):41-52.
　HU Liwen,LIU Ziqing,HE Xiang.Research on the Influence of Independent Directors’ Compensation Incentive on Inefficient Investment[J].,2021,(01):41-52.
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独立董事薪酬激励对非效率投资的影响研究()
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《金融教育研究》[ISSN:1006-6977/CN:61-1281/TN]

卷:
期数:
2021年01期
页码:
41-52
栏目:
出版日期:
2021-01-25

文章信息/Info

Title:
Research on the Influence of Independent Directors’ Compensation Incentive on Inefficient Investment
文章编号:
2095-0098(2021)01-0041-12
作者:
胡礼文;  刘子青;  贺 湘
江西师范大学 财政金融学院,江西 南昌 330022
Author(s):
HU Liwen;  LIU Ziqing;  HE Xiang
School of Finance,Jiangxi Normal University,Nanchang,Jiangxi 330022,China
关键词:
独立董事;  薪酬激励;  非效率投资;  产权性质
Keywords:
Independent directors;  Compensation incentives;  Inefficient investment;  Nature of property rights
分类号:
F272
文献标志码:
A
摘要:
独立董事薪酬对非效率投资的影响存有争议。以2008—2018年间中国A股上市公司为研究样本,基于激励、心理契约等理论,将薪酬激励区分为激励过度与激励不足,同时提出竞争性假设,分析独立董事薪酬激励与非效率投资间的关系。研究表明,薪酬激励过度是对独立董事能力与努力的补偿,能调动他们的履职积极性,抑制非效率投资; 而薪酬激励不足会使独立董事觉得不公,弱化行权意愿,加剧非效率投资。进一步的研究发现,无论是激励过度还是激励不足,独立董事都主要作用于投资过度行为,进而对非效率投资产生影响; 独立董事的治理作用还受到产权性质的制约,薪酬激励不足的独立董事对非效率投资的加剧作用在非国有企业表现更为显著。
Abstract:
The influence of independent directors’ compensation on inefficient investment is controversial.Taking Chinese A-share listed companies from 2008 to 2018 as research samples,based on theories of incentive and psychological contract,the compensation incentive is divided into excessive incentive and insufficient incentive.Meanwhile,the competitive hypothesis is proposed to analyze the relationship between independent directors’ compensation incentive and inefficient investment.The study found that excessive incentives compensates the ability and efforts of independent directors,arouses their enthusiasm to perform their duties,and inhibits inefficient investment,while insufficient incentives makes independent directors feel unfair,weakens their willingness to exercise rights,and aggravates inefficient investment.The further study found that whether the incentive is excessive or insufficient,independent directors mainly act on excessive investment behavior,which in turn has an impact on inefficient investment.Finally,we found that the governance role of independent directors is also restricted by the nature of property rights,and the aggravation of inefficient investment by independent directors with insufficient incentive is more significant in non-state-owned enterprises.

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备注/Memo

备注/Memo:
收稿日期:2020-12-07
基金项目:江西省教育厅研究生创新基金项目“独立董事薪酬激励对非效率投资的影响研究”(YC2020-S145)
作者简介:胡礼文(1965-),男,江西兴国人,硕士,教授,研究方向为企业战略管理。
更新日期/Last Update: 2021-02-10