[1]李松,卢宇燕,洪正,等.加强公司治理能够防止金融机构过度冒险吗?——关于高管激励与银行冒险行为的一个综述[J].金融教育研究,2012,(01):57-64.
　LI Song,LU Yuyan,HONG Zheng.Can Improving Corporate Governance Help Solve over Risk -Taking Problem in Banking Industry --Survey about Executive Incentives and Bank- Risk- Taking Behavior[J].,2012,(01):57-64.
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加强公司治理能够防止金融机构过度冒险吗?——关于高管激励与银行冒险行为的一个综述()
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《金融教育研究》[ISSN:1006-6977/CN:61-1281/TN]

卷:
期数:
2012年01期
页码:
57-64
栏目:
出版日期:
2012-01-31

文章信息/Info

Title:
Can Improving Corporate Governance Help Solve over Risk -Taking Problem in Banking Industry --Survey about Executive Incentives and Bank- Risk- Taking Behavior
作者:
李松;卢宇燕;洪正;
西南财经大学中国金融研究中心,四川成都,610074; 中国人民银行,北京,100032
Author(s):
LI Song;  LU Yuyan;  HONG Zheng
关键词:
高管薪酬; 公司治理; 冒险行为; 金融监管
Keywords:
executive compensation;  risk - taking behavior;  corporate governance;  financial regulation
分类号:
D922.291.91; F830
文献标志码:
A
摘要:
文章总结了银行高管激励与冒险行为的理论和实证研究,认为银行高管激励结构通过强调奖金与股票期权等短期的显性激励以及解职的隐形激励鼓励了冒险行为,增大了金融机构的风险也加大了金融系统性风险,而施加这种激励结构的正是偏好于短期冒险行为的银行股东。文章的研究为金融监管改革提供了参考,认为加强股东对高管薪酬和企业决策的影响并不能缓解银行的冒险行为,监管措施更应当着眼于权衡股东利益与金融稳定的冲突,而危机以后各国采取的监管加强措施可能并不能改善金融机构过度冒险的情况。
Abstract:
This paper summarizes the theoretical and empirical research about bank executive incentives and risk -taking behavior. Bank executive compensation, through bonuses and stock options, both short - term visible incentive and the invisible incentive, emphasized on short -turn incentive and encouraged bank -risk -taking behavior. This compensation structure reflected the risk preference of shareholders. The study of this paper shed light on prudential bank regulation. It reveals that improving corporate governance of bank industry would not help stabilizing financial system. Optimal bank regulation should focus on the conflict between the interests of shareholder and the stability of financial system.

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更新日期/Last Update: 1900-01-01