[1]袁春生,吴丽丽.经理人治理理论模型:述评与展望[J].金融教育研究,2014,(03):51-56.
 YUAN Chunsheng,WU Lili.A Review of Theoretical Models about Manager Governance[J].,2014,(03):51-56.
点击复制

经理人治理理论模型:述评与展望()
分享到:

《金融教育研究》[ISSN:1006-6977/CN:61-1281/TN]

卷:
期数:
2014年03期
页码:
51-56
栏目:
出版日期:
2014-06-30

文章信息/Info

Title:
A Review of Theoretical Models about Manager Governance
作者:
袁春生;吴丽丽;
江西师范大学 财政金融学院,江西 南昌,330022
Author(s):
YUAN Chunsheng; WU Lili
关键词:
激励模型学习模型经理人权力管理才能配置
Keywords:
incentive model learning model manager authority administrative ability
分类号:
F272.92
文献标志码:
A
摘要:
近几十年来完善公司治理以减少经理人代理成本的研究得到了蓬勃发展,其中一个分支是经理人治理研究。经理人治理作用受到学术界广泛关注,并取得了丰富的研究成果,为经理人市场变迁的相关经济现象提供了颇具竞争性的理论解释。文章在系统梳理相关文献的基础上,对经理人激励、经理人能力的学习、管理才能配置等理论模型进行简要介绍与评述,最后进一步展望此领域的未来研究方向。
Abstract:
For some decades researches of improving corporate governance by reducing agency cost of managers are booming,and the research of manager governance mechanism is a branch. The role of manager governance has been paid great attention by academe,and many competitive theories have been made to explain the related econom-ic phenomena of manager from the angle of labor market change. This paper briefly reviewed the theoretical models of incentive,learning ability,and administrative ability for managers,and the future researches of manager govern-ance was discussed and developed.

参考文献/References:

[1]Fee C.and C.Hadlock.Raids,Rewards,and Reputations in the Market for Managerial Talent[J].Review of Financial Studies,2003,16(4):1315-1357.
[2]Gillan Stuart L.Recent Developments in Corporate Governance:An Overview[J].Journal of Corporate Finance,2006,12(3):381-402.
[3]Fama.E,Jensen M.C.Separation of Ownership and Control,Journal of Law and Economics[J].1983,26(2):301-325
[4]Jensen,M.C,W.Meckling.Theory of the Firm:Managerial Behavior,Agency Costs and Ownership Structure[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1976,3(4):305-360.
[5]Murphy K.J.Incentives,Learning,and Compensation:A Theoretical and Empirical Investigation of Managerial Labor Contracts[J].The RAND Journal of Economics,1986,17(1):59-76.
[6]Jensen,M.C,and K.J.Murphy.Performance Pay and Top Management Incentives.Journal of Political Economy,1990,98(2):225-264.
[7]Chen Hui,Leng Fei.Pay-Performance Sensitivity in a Heterogeneous Managerial Labor Market[J].Journal of Management Accounting Research,2004,16(1):19-33.
[8]Fama,E.Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm[J].Journal of Political Economy,1980,88(2):288-307.
[9]Holmstrom,B.Managerial incentive problems:a dynamic perspective.In Essays in Economics and Management in Honor of Lars Wahlbeck.Helsinki:Swedish School of Economics.1982.
[10]Zabojnik J.On the Efficiency of Markets for Managers[J].Economic Theory,2001,18(3):701-710.
[11]Tadelis Steven.The Market for Reputations as an Incentive Mechanism[J].Journal of Political Economy,2002,110(4):854-882.
[12]Gibbons.R.,and Murphy K.J.Optimal Incentive Contracts in the Presence of Career Concerns:Theory and Evidence[J].Journal of Political Economy,1992,100(3):468-505.
[13]Milbourn,Todd T.CEO Reputation and Stock-based Compensation[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2003,68(2):233-262.
[14]Harris,M.and Holmstrom,B.A Theory of Wage Dynamics[J].Review of Economic Studies,1982,49(3):315-333.
[15]Taylor,L.CEO Pay and CEO Power:Evidence from a Dynamic Learning Model,Working paper,The Wharton School,University of Pennsylvania,Philadelphia.2010
[16]Chan W.External Recruitment versus Internal Promotion[J].Journal of Labor Economics,1996,14(4):555-570.
[17]Hermalin BE.Trends in Corporate Governance[J].Journal of Finance,2005,60(5):2351-2384.
[18]Murphy.K.J.,and J.Zabojnik.Managerial Capital and the Market for CEOs,working paper,http://ssrn.com/abstract=984376.2007.
[19]Conyon Martin J.,Laura E.Read.A Model of the Supply of Executives for Outside Directorships[J].Journal of Corporate Finance,2006,12(3):645-659.
[20]Gabaix,X.,and A.Landier.Why Has CEO Pay Increased So Much?[J].Quarterly Journal of Economics,2008,123(1):49-100.
[21]Edmans,A.,and X.Gabaix.The Effect of Risk on the CEO Market[J].Review of Financial Studies,2011,24(8):2822-2863.
[22]Baranchuk.N.,MacDonald.G.Jun Yang.The Economics of Super Managers[J].The Review of Financial Studies,2011,24(10):3321-3368.
[23]Bebchuk,Lucian,Jesse Fried,and David Walker.Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation[J].University of Chicago Law Review,2002,69:751-846.

备注/Memo

备注/Memo:
国家自然科学基金项目“民营上市公司外聘高管的代理成本与激励机制效果:基于经理人市场视角”(71262025); 国家社会科学基金项目“非正式制度对我国会计准则执行的影响研究”(12BJY015)
更新日期/Last Update: 1900-01-01