[1]陈伟光,谢峰.政府干预、预算软约束与绿色信贷失效[J].金融教育研究,2013,(02):12-19.
 CHEN Weiguang,XIE Feng.Governmental Interference、Soft Budget Restraint & Failure of Green Loan[J].,2013,(02):12-19.
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政府干预、预算软约束与绿色信贷失效()
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《金融教育研究》[ISSN:1006-6977/CN:61-1281/TN]

卷:
期数:
2013年02期
页码:
12-19
栏目:
出版日期:
2013-03-31

文章信息/Info

Title:
Governmental Interference、Soft Budget Restraint & Failure of Green Loan
作者:
陈伟光;谢峰;
广东外语外贸大学财经学院,广东广州,510006
Author(s):
CHEN Weiguang; XIE Feng
关键词:
政府干预预算软约束绿色信贷
Keywords:
governmental interference soft budget restraint green loan
分类号:
F830
文献标志码:
A
摘要:
政府为了治理伴随着我国经济发展所出现的生态环境问题,采取了诸多规制措施来遏制生态恶化和环境污染。绿色信贷作为相关政策的重要一环,其实施效果却欠佳。文章对绿色信贷困境所进行的研究表明:地方政府干预、预算软约束,导致面临晋升竞争的地方政府官员和国有银行经理均缺乏激励实施绿色信贷,金融资源未能按照社会福利最大化的方式配置,出现了资源误配,从而使得政策失灵。基于上述结论,文章提出改革政府和国有银行绩效考核机制,进一步推进市场化改革等政策建议。
Abstract:
To solve the ecological and environmental issues arising with China's economy development,government has taken plenty of actions to curb the deterioration of ecology system and environmental pollution.Green loan considered as one of the important parts of relevant policies,its implemental effects aren't that satisfactory.In this paper,we comprehensively use info-economics,new instituitional ecnomics and new political economics to do some research on the dilemma facing green loan,and we achive these conclusions:the dual-governance failure facing the governments and banks lead to the lack of incentives for local governmental officials as well as state-owned banks'managers who suffer from promotion competition to implement green loan,financial resources aren't distributed in the way of maximizing social welfare,resource misallocating is arising.Based on above sentiments,we offer some policy suggestion such as reform the performance evaluation mechanism of governments and state-owned bankes,deepen the market-oriented reform etc.

参考文献/References:

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备注/Memo

备注/Memo:
广东省社科规划项目:服务于产业升级的绿色信贷机制设计-基于广东省的分析(08E-06); 教育部人文社会科学规划项目:服务于产业升级的绿色金融机制设计(09YJA790052); 广东省文科基地重大项目:国际金融危机下贸易保护主义新趋势与广东外经贸政策研究(09JDXM79012)
更新日期/Last Update: 1900-01-01